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Abstract 
This paper studies platform ecosystems, a novel 
business entity built upon a platform coordinating the 
interactions between suppliers and users, particularly 
in the IT service sectors. Borrowing words from two 
core firm theories resource-based view (RBV) and 
transaction cost view (TCV), we propose that the 
platform ecosystem works at the boundary between 
“market and hierarchy.” To show this, we develop a 
conceptual, stylized, dynamic model for the platform 
ecosystem with typical notions in RBV and TCV: in 
particular, installed-base, player heterogeneity, and 
platform’s investment as primary ingredients. Our 
findings from equilibrium analyses and simulations 
largely confirm that both RVB and TCV are valid for 
understanding a platform ecosystem. We, however, also 
identify some contingencies where RBV is limited, and 
propose a hypothesis that the platform’ investment is 
more crucial for fostering an ecosystem. This implies 
that the platform starts from the point near market and 
maneuvers the ecosystem toward a hierarchy, utilizing 
its investment as a driver. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With IT becoming prevalent in our society, the 
platform business has emerged as a novel solution for 
production and delivery of various IT services. 
Facebook, and Google represent the most successful 
cases of the platform business. Such a new business 
form, however, usually constructs its own business 
ecosystem by engaging diverse participants: users, 
input suppliers, and other types of complementors ([6] 
[11] [27]). Accordingly, the value creation mechanism 
undergoes a major transformation. For example, the 
platforms within their ecosystems do not always show 
the profit-maximizing behavior ([15] [19]). Further, the 
value creation mechanism is different from the one in 
the traditional value chain model ([23]). For example, 
the way that value is created in the models of two-
sided market or multi-sided platform ([8] [14] [24]) 
can be hardly described as a linear value chain. The 
non-linear interactions among the participants in an 
industry or an ecosystem can be described with the 
notion of ‘value network ([1] [22]).’ However, the 
platform ecosystems present additional dimensions 
upon their network structures due to the active role of 
the platforms ([9] [11]), thereby enhancing non-linear 
value creation. We observe this nonlinearity in a 
platform ecosystem, and develop a stylized model from 
the perspectives of firm theory for deep understanding 
of its organizational nature. 
This study proposes a novel conceptual model that 
analyzes the value creation mechanism on the basis of 
interactions across the platform’s participants. For 
acquiring a new perspective on platform ecosystems, 
we first consider the relationship between market and 
hierarchy ([29]) in the firm theory. In particular, the 
value creation mechanism in the platform ecosystems 
is studied on the basis of two representative 
perspectives on firms: that is, resource-based view 
(RBV) and transaction cost view (TCV). According to 
RBV, the accumulated participants turn into the 
platform’s idiosyncratic assets ([25]). And TCV 
requires the platform’s active responses to reduce the 
transaction costs across the participants ([7] [11]). 
Our stylized model presents an abstraction of the 
service operations organized by a platform through the 
lens of both perspectives. We also focus on the 
leadership of the platform to create a virtuous circle of 
creating value and sustaining the ecosystem. In 
particular, we aim to derive answers to the following 
questions from our model and analysis: 
 
 Will the size of active players (users and suppliers 
participating in a platform ecosystem) reinforce the 
platform’s leadership in an ecosystem? 
 Will the platform’s investment to reduce the 
transaction costs borne by the participants encourage 
the prosperity of the entire ecosystem? 
 What are the contingencies and the drivers that 
affect the growth path of the platform ecosystem? 
What implications do these factors have for the 
platform’s role: e.g., market vs. hierarchy? 
 
2. Market, organization, and platform 
ecosystem 
 
2.1 Understanding of platform ecosystems 
 
The early development of the value chain models 
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helped establish the fundamental framework for linear 
production systems in the era of mass production 
([23]). Here, value is created through the activities of a 
chain of players, who are arranged in one direction 
along a straight line starting from the suppliers and 
ending at the customers. With great recognition of the 
importance of efficient supply chain management, this 
model is most suitable for sequential productions with 
value added step-by-step along the chain. 
However, recent phenomena, particularly observed 
in the IT service sectors, present a new aspect of value 
creation. This calls for a novel theory to integrate the 
firm theories in a new style. As is evident from the 
success stories of global giant platforms such as Apple, 
Facebook, Google, etc., the current wave characterized 
by keywords like “social” and “mobile” makes the 
service lifecycle short and require agility in the value 
creation mechanism. To cope with these challenges, 
flexible partnerships are necessary, and a player acting 
as a pivot is required in many situations. Platforms are 
now playing this role. They organize resources from 
diverse partners (e.g., complementors, input suppliers, 
and distributors) and coordinate their varied interests. 
As a result, it is no longer remarkable characteristics or 
technology owned by a single company but a holistic 
complex body comprising multiple inputs from various 
participants that determines competitive advantage. 
Accordingly, the business paradigm has shifted, at least 
in the IT service sectors, from a stand-alone business 
model led by a flagship company to a community-like 
one built upon a platform ([15]). 
This outlook indicates that platforms lie at the 
center of value creation. However, they also present a 
new challenge in terms of understanding and analyzing 
the value creation mechanism based on a platform. 
Traditional frameworks such as the value chain model 
fall short of capturing the essential features of platform 
activities. Indeed, many participants with diverse 
interests in the platform business interact with each 
other quite differently from those in the value chain. 
First, the partners of a platform belong to different 
business fields or industries and form more than a 
simple supplier-buyer relationship. The structure of 
their relationships cannot be properly described as a 
chain of dyadic relations; rather, it is closer to a 
network. Therefore, a linear model fails in modeling 
the mechanism of value creation by a platform. 
In order to emphasize this difference, we employ 
the term “platform ecosystem,” which is now 
frequently encountered in literature ([9] [15] [17] [18] 
[19] [20]). In our platform ecosystem, the platform 
establishes the strategic position as a keystone and 
takes charge of as well as responsibility for creating 
values throughout the ecosystem. All the core 
transactions are mediated by the platform that hinders 
service flows from running along multiple paths. This 
fundamental feature of a platform ecosystem lies in the 
role of the platform in connecting different needs that 
otherwise could not access each other ([14]). Thus, a 
platform creates a new marketplace which could not 
exist without it (in this regard, the platform works as if 
it were a market). Moreover, the value in a platform 
ecosystem is not added in a step-by-step fashion 
following a chain of dyadic relations; instead, it reveals 
itself at the final delivery stage. 
However, a platform cannot exclusively possess all 
the resources. Thus, it needs to be open and share some 
components of its resources in order to foster its 
ecosystem. However, a platform does not fully open 
everything. It may open core resources but maintains 
its control over those resources ([4] [6] [7] [12] [13]). 
Owing to this loosely coupled governance, the entire 
ecosystem is able to achieve a balance between 
openness and control, and makes the entire ecosystem 
look as if an organization: e.g., a balance between 
proprietary and non-proprietary assets ([7] [16]).  
The delineation above reveals the underlying 
reason for the linear value chain model not being 
applicable to the platform ecosystems. In fact, the 
unique nature of the platform could be confirmed by its 
behavior in practice. For example, the basic principle 
upon which a platform organizes and leads an 
ecosystem—the organizing principle—does not seem 
to be based on sheer profit-seeking driver ([8] [10] [11] 
[15] [19] [20]). Rather, the organizing principle seems 
to emerge as a product of evolution, in which the 
participants coordinate and compete with each other, 
and interact with and adapt to various environmental 
factors. In the course of platform’s growth, its fitness 
largely depends on the efficiency and agility generated 
from its relationships with its partners. 
 
2.2 Firm theories applied to platform ecosystem 
 
The primary objective of our study is to find the 
key characteristics of platform ecosystems from the 
organizational perspective. This viewpoint bears not 
only theoretical but also practical implications since 
many legislation and policy issues around the platform 
ecosystems are closely related with their organizational 
nature. Thus, it is necessary to incorporate some key 
notions from the firm theory into our framework. We 
started with following the traditional development of 
the firm theory, and finally decided to consider two 
major streams in this areaTCV (transaction cost 
view) and RBV (resource-based view)to develop a 
stylized model representing the essential features of the 
platform ecosystems through the lens of firm theory. 
First, TCV ([5] [29]) requests a platform’s 
aggressive actions to reduce the transaction costs 
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across the participants: e.g., developing efficient 
interfaces, standardizing inter-operations, providing 
SDK. Meanwhile, RBV ([2] [3] [21] [26] [28]) asserts 
that the network woven by the participants in an 
ecosystem generates new assets. For example, the fact 
that the connections between the participants should be 
mediated by a platform empowers the platform and 
strengthens its keystone position: e.g., leveraging the 
network externality. Thus, RBV suggests that the new 
assets generated by the forging the links between the 
participants establish core competency for the 
prosperity of the ecosystems (e.g., accumulated 
participants as a platform’s idiosyncratic asset; [25]). 
In our stylized model, the platform tries to leverage 
both transaction efficiency (TCV) and asset specificity 
(RBV). The goal of our modelling and analyses is to 
gain an insight into the role of platform leadership 
toward a value-creation virtuous cycle throughout an 
ecosystem. Specifically, we are interested in the 
following aspects of the platform ecosystems:  
 
 Investments on platform infrastructure (‘infra’ in 
brief): Infra provided by a platform is a fundamental 
base of value creation for the sake of the participants 
in its ecosystem. For this purpose, the platform 
needs to regularly invest in its infrastructure so that 
it can maintain and improve transaction efficiency.  
 Participatory base: The participants such as 
complementors not only give a boost to an 
ecosystem but also contribute as an idiosyncratic 
asset to the platform, for example, by attracting 
other potential participants. Because of this feature 
of the participants, the platform provides many 
incentives to expand its participatory base (e.g., free 
subscription, low licensing fee, subsidy, etc.).  
 Holistic ecosystem value: The total value created 
through an ecosystem does not necessarily translate 
directly into profits of the platform (this makes the 
value creation mechanism nonlinear, as explained 
above). However, the platform still undertakes the 
responsibility for the holistic value. In this regard, 
the platform can be viewed to exist not for 
maximizing its profit but for fostering the ecosystem 
by inducing potential participants to join the system 
and promoting transactions across the participants. 
 
3. Service operations in platform ecosystem 
 
3.1 Platform ecosystem model 
 
In our model, the platform ecosystem is composed 
of three echelons: (potential) suppliers – platform – 
(potential) users. Potential suppliers and users are 
horizontally differentiated. As for the user group U, a 
user is given an index 𝑢𝑢  according to his/her 
preference toward service diversity, which is assumed 
to be determined by the number of suppliers on the 
other side. Suppliers are similarly differentiated based 
on the level of cost or inefficiency. Specifically, we 
define U ≡ [0, 𝑢𝑢�] and S ≡ [0, ?̅?𝑠], where users and 
suppliers are populated over the sets U and S, 
respectively. Potential users and suppliers are 
horizontally differentiated according to the functions 
𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢)  and 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) , each of which represents the 
preference strength of user 𝑢𝑢  and the cost 
(inefficiency) factor of supplier 𝑠𝑠, respectively. Users 
are populated on U in a descending order of 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) 
(𝑑𝑑′(𝑢𝑢) < 0). On the other hand, suppliers are arranged 
in an ascending order of 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) (𝑞𝑞′(𝑠𝑠) > 0). 
The payoff functions of a user 𝑢𝑢 ∈ U  and a 
supplier 𝑠𝑠 ∈ S  are defined as follows ( ζ𝑡𝑡 ≠ 0 
assumed). Hereafter, the subscript ‘𝑡𝑡’ represents the 
corresponding time period. (For the sake of enhanced 
readability, however, we sometimes drop ‘𝑡𝑡’ when its 
omission does not seem to cause any confusion.) 
 
𝜇𝜇(𝑢𝑢) = 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢)ζ𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡   Eq. 1 
𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) ζ𝑡𝑡�    Eq. 2 
 
Eq. (1) indicates that user’s payoff is determined by 
the strength of preference toward the diversity and the 
service fee 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡  that he/she pays for the services 
delivered through the platform. Furthermore, the 
benefit is proportional to the level of efforts (ζ𝑡𝑡) that 
the platform puts on for maintaining and improving 
transaction quality. Thus, this investment is assumed to 
strengthen the indirect network externality. 
Suppose that each supplier provides one unit of 
input or contribution (either product or service). Then, 
with given price 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 for their services, the payoff of 
supplier 𝑠𝑠  (∈ S) is set by Eq. (2). The suppliers’ 
benefits are also affected by the positive indirect 
network externality from the user side. However, there 
is a negative network externality in the supplier side, 
which indicates the competition costs imposed upon 
the active suppliers. Hereafter, the former (positive) 
externality will be simply called the “network effect” 
and the latter the “congestion effect.” Also note that the 
investment of the platform helps to improve suppliers’ 
transactions, thereby reducing the actual operating 
costs and alleviating the congestion effect. 
Now, our platform seeks its profit not by leveraging 
price structure (as typical platforms in two-sided 
market models do) but by managing the installed-
bases, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡  and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 . This assumption fits well our 
viewpoint on the platform described in Section 2 (also 
refer to the role of platforms explained there). Further, 
we also assume a myopic platform since the behaviors 
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of most platforms in practice do not seem to be 
consistent with those of perfectly forward-looking 
players. Therefore, at the point of decision (refer to 
Fig. 1), the platform’s concerns reduce to one step 
change (i.e., net increase or decrease during the 
corresponding period) of participants. 
And many platforms in practice are trying to 
maintain (and hopefully increase) their installed-bases 
and put much efforts (e.g., marketing, subsidy, and 
other investments) on competitive segments. Thus, the 
actual behavior of platforms could be described as 
seeking for an optimal balance between the net 
increase of the bases and the amount of efforts 
invested. Accordingly, the platform is assumed to focus 
only on the gains from the newcomers in both sides 
(∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡  and ∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ) in 𝑡𝑡 . Now, the platform faces the 
following decision problem in each period of time 𝑡𝑡. 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ζ𝑡𝑡 Π𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚⋅∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏⋅∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐⋅ζ𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡. 0 ≤ ζ𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡   Eq. 3 
 
The payoff is comprised of the net earning 
increments from both sides and the investment 
expenditure. Since ∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and/or ∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 may be negative 
(e.g., when there are more playerseither users or 
suppliersleaving the ecosystem than those joining it 
in 𝑡𝑡), Eq. (3) actually could mean a loss minimization 
in some periods. We will derive the net changes later 
(refer to Eq. (6) and (7) and the notion of ‘critical 
player’ introduced just before these equations).  
The platform also needs to deliberate on the 
investment. Indeed, many studies on platform 
businesses assert that one of practical challenges they 
are facing (in particular, at the early stage of launching 
and stabilizing the platform) is to commit a big 
investment in order to keep running the projects for 
redesigning the value creation mechanism and 
enhancing associated value flows. We will also show 
that both ∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and ∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 are the functions of ζ𝑡𝑡 in our 
dynamics introduced and analyzed in the next section. 
Accordingly, the optimization problem above is not 
trivial as shown in Proposition 5 in Section 4. 
However, the amount of investment is bounded by 
the available budget at the current time, which is also 
dynamically determined by the ultimate sources of the 
gains from its value creation. The value created in the 
platform ecosystem is fed back to the system in the 
next period. The ecosystem grows based on this 
feedback mechanism, which specifies the dynamics of 
our stylized model. That is, a large portion of this 
feedback flows throughout the entire ecosystem and 
eventually affects the platform’s capability such as 
financial budget. Thus, the budget capacity in the next 
period 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 will be adjusted due to the change in the 
number of active players, the idiosyncratic asset of the 
platform according to RBV. Specifically, investment 
capability of the platform changes according to not 
only ∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 but also ∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡. The rate of change in 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 is 
assumed to be proportional to a convex combination of 
the rates of changes in 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡  and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 . With 𝛾𝛾 for this 
parameter, Eq. (4) represents a general representation 
of the budget dynamics from 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  to 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1. 
 
𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 �1 + 𝛾𝛾 ∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢t + (1 − 𝛾𝛾) ∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 �  Eq. 4 
, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. 
 
Note that the payoffs are determined in a nonlinear 
way and the ecosystem creates the value differently 
from what traditional value chains do. For example, the 
platform should take care of not only its profit but also 
the holistic ecosystem. Therefore, the payoff function 
of the platform becomes quite different from the 
additive form employed in linear value chain models. 
Another major distinction comes from the 
interrelationship between users and suppliers. The 
relationships among the three players form a triad. That 
is, the connection between a user and a supplier is 
established via the platform while the actual service 
flows (business transactions) occur between the user 
and the supplier. This feature is reflected in the way of 
determining 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 , the service fee between users and 
suppliers at time period 𝑡𝑡 . Unlike traditional value 
chains where a keystone player with negotiation power 
usually sets and controls 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡, the major revenue streams 
for the platform come from the size of participants in 
its ecosystem. Since our model assumes a plentiful of 
users and suppliers, the price 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 will be determined by 
the typical principle of supply and demand; that is, 
both users and suppliers behave as a price taker. 
Accordingly, we incorporate an adaptive dynamics 
frequently employed in the studies with the supply-
demand interactions above. Thus, the price change ∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 
is supposed to follow the equation below: 
 
∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿𝑢𝑢 ∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 ∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡   Eq. 5 
, where 𝛿𝛿𝑢𝑢 and 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 are positive constant weights (< 1). 
 
Lastly, the number of users [suppliers] in the next 
time period is determined by a convex combination of 
the current size 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡  [𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡] and the deviation from the 
‘critical’ size 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  [𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ], where 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  is defined as the 
corresponding index of the user [supplier] who is 
indifferent between joining and leaving the system: i.e., 
𝜇𝜇(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) = 0 [𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) = 0]. Note first that the critical user 
[supplier] is well defined since users [suppliers] are 
arranged and indexed in descending [ascending] order 
of 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) [𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠)] over U [S]. Thus, the critical user 
[supplier] may well represent the expected size of 
active users [suppliers]. 
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Δ𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡)  Eq. 6 
Δ𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽(𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)  Eq. 7 
, where 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽 ≤ 1. 
 
Here, 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 are adjustment parameters (as γ 
in Eq. 4) in the respective adaptive processes. For 
example, 𝛼𝛼 = 1, users instantaneously respond to the 
critical player (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ), and rapidly adjust themselves 
toward the point. With 𝛼𝛼 [𝛽𝛽] = 0, meanwhile, users 
[suppliers] do not switch and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 [𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡] remains fixed. 
For example, with given ζ𝑡𝑡  set by the platform 
and other parameters at the beginning of 𝑡𝑡, (potential) 
users decide whether to join the ecosystem or not. They 
regard the number of suppliers 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  as given at the 
moment (actually updated at the end of the previous 
period; i.e., 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1). In the course of (potential) 
users’ movement—staying, joining, and leaving—, the 
critical user 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 is determined. It will be quite common 
in practice, however, that there is a gap between the 
expected number of users (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) and the size of actual 
users at the beginning (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡), which results in 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ≠ 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
in general. The same adjustment procedure applies to 
the supplier side (with 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 , and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  (≠ 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  in 
usual)). Because of these mismatches, some users 
and/or suppliers may experience negative payoffs for a 
while. Upon this gap, the size of active users 
[suppliers] in the next period, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1 [𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1] is adjusted 
based on Eq. (6) [Eq. (7)]. Fig. 1 summaries the event 
sequence in our stylized adjustment process. 
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline 
Platform’s investment decision is assumed to be accomplished at the 
beginning of each time period. This action triggers the adjustment 
process and eventually leads to a new state for the next period 𝑡𝑡+1. 
 
3.2 Steady state equilibrium analysis 
 
We now analyze the steady state equilibriums in the 
platform ecosystem with respect to the payoff 
functions (Eq. (1) and (2)). First, we define the 
possible types of equilibrium as follows: 
 
 Interior equilibrium (eq.): �𝑢𝑢∗, 𝑠𝑠∗�, where 𝑢𝑢∗ and 
𝑠𝑠∗ belong to (0, 𝑢𝑢�) and (0, ?̅?𝑠), respectively, 
 Boundary eq. at the full saturation: �𝑢𝑢� , ?̅?𝑠�, 
 Boundary eq.’s of partial saturation: �𝑢𝑢� , 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐�  or 
�𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐, ?̅?𝑠�, where 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐  < 𝑢𝑢�  and 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐  < ?̅?𝑠, 
 Boundary eq. at the complete collapse: (0, 0). 
 
We do not consider the equilibria where only one 
side (user or supplier) vanishes in the ecosystem. That 
is, we accept neither �0, 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐�  nor �𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 , 0�  as an 
admissible state. This exclusion is quite reasonable 
since they look absurd; for instance, �0, 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐� means a 
certain number of suppliers without a single user. 
The following Proposition says that the boundary 
equilibrium at the complete collapse (0, 0) could be a 
Nash equilibrium. (Since we deal with a steady state, 
we omit the subscript ‘𝑡𝑡’ in the following propositions 
and explanations for readability.) 
 
Proposition 1 (Complete Collapse Nash Equilibrium) 
The boundary equilibrium where both sides of the 
ecosystem collapse is a Nash equilibrium if 𝑟𝑟 > 0. 
 
Proof (Omitted; to be provided upon request) 
 
One needs to be careful when interpreting 
Proposition 1. First of all, the condition (𝑟𝑟 > 0) is not a 
sufficient one. That is, there could be many 
possibilities where other types of state become 
equilibrium with 𝑟𝑟 > 0. Thus, we should not conclude 
that the collapse is more likely to occur in the platform 
ecosystem. On the contrary, it will be shown that other 
types of the boundary equilibriums are rather more 
prevalent not only in practice but also in theory. 
Numerical simulations in the next section also 
demonstrate that the collapse does not seem prevalent 
in the platform ecosystem. 
Now, it is necessary to examine the other states for 
a Nash equilibrium. For this purpose, we first need to 
explicitly express the critical players in terms of the 
corresponding parameters and the decision variable of 
the platform. For example, the critical user in our 
model locates at 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 = 𝜇𝜇−1(0). First, we assume that 
all the players are homogenous: i.e., 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) = 𝑑𝑑 for all 
𝑢𝑢 ∈ U and 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞 for all 𝑠𝑠 ∈ S, where both 𝑑𝑑 and 
q are positive constants. After analyzing the 
homogenous case, we deal with the heterogeneous 
players in one side with linear differentiation (e.g., 
𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 , where 𝑞𝑞  is a positive constant). More 
general cases where both users and suppliers are 
heterogeneous will be dealt with in the experiments. 
The following Propositions present possible steady 
state equilibriums together with respective conditions 
under the corresponding assumptions on homogeneity 
of players. Since the complete collapse state also 
constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the following cases 
(note that there is no restriction on the players’ variety 
in Proposition 1), we omit this boundary equilibrium 
in our statement of the following Propositions.  
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Proposition 2 (Homogenous Players) 
Suppose that ζ be given by the platform. In the 
platform ecosystem with homogeneous players (i.e., 
𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) = 𝑑𝑑 and 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑 and 𝑞𝑞 are constants), we 
can observe in a steady state that the full saturation 
state �𝑢𝑢� , ?̅?𝑠� becomes a Nash equilibrium when the 
following inequalities hold: 
𝑟𝑟
𝑑𝑑ζ
 ≤ ?̅?𝑠 ≤ 𝑟𝑟ζ
𝑞𝑞
 𝑢𝑢�  . 
 
Proof (Omitted; to be provided upon request) 
 
The proof of Proposition 2 also implies that there 
is no interior equilibrium in the case of homogeneous 
players. Furthermore, the other types of boundary 
equilibriums except the full saturation state (i.e., partial 
saturation states) cannot be sustained as a Nash 
equilibrium. This implies a possible contingency where 
the installed-bases determine the platform’s maximum 
payoffs, thereby serving as an ultimate source of 
platform’s growth. The platform’s investment, 
however, is also involved in this contingency (refer to 
the condition in Proposition 2, which holds for large 
investment (ζ)). In sum, homogeneous participants, as 
idiosyncratic assets for the platform (RBV), may exert 
influence on the ecosystem, but this potential can be 
realized and enhanced through the platform’s efforts to 
improve the relevant transactions (TCV). 
 
Proposition 3 (Heterogeneous Suppliers) 
Suppose that ζ be determined and given. In the 
platform ecosystem with homogeneous users (𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) =
𝑑𝑑) and heterogeneous suppliers with 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 (the 
second 𝑞𝑞 is a positive constant), we can observe in a 
steady state that each of the following states becomes a 
Nash equilibrium when the corresponding conditions 
are satisfied. Here, 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 = �𝑟𝑟ζ𝑢𝑢� 𝑞𝑞⁄ : 
a) �𝑢𝑢� , ?̅?𝑠� , the boundary equilibrium at the full 
saturation state with 𝑟𝑟 (𝑑𝑑ζ)⁄  ≤ ?̅?𝑠 ≤ 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐, 
b) �𝑢𝑢� , 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐� , the boundary equilibrium at a partial 
saturation state with 𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞 �𝑑𝑑2ζ3�⁄  < 𝑢𝑢�  and 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 < ?̅?𝑠. 
 
Proof (Omitted; to be provided upon request) 
 
Similar to the all-homogeneous case, an interior 
equilibrium does not exist. However, we now have 
another type of boundary equilibrium with a partial 
saturation in the supplier side. To put this situation in 
another way, even with the saturation of the user side, 
there are some suppliers who would not join the 
ecosystem due to their inefficiencies in making 
business transactions with users. Examining 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 in the 
Proposition, we know that increasing investment will 
maneuver the partial saturation state into the full 
saturation one (i.e., increasing 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 beyond ?̅?𝑠) since it 
reduces the transaction costs and makes suppliers’ 
participation more affordable. 
 
Proposition 4 (Heterogeneous Users) 
Suppose that ζ be determined and given. In the 
platform ecosystem with homogeneous suppliers 
( 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞 ) and heterogeneous users with 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) =
𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢� − 𝑢𝑢) (the second 𝑑𝑑 is a positive constant), we 
can observe [cannot observe] in a steady state that the 
following candidate states constitutes a Nash 
equilibrium when the corresponding condition holds: 
a) �𝑢𝑢� , 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐�, where 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 ∈ (0, ?̅?𝑠], cannot be a boundary 
equilibrium with 𝑟𝑟 > 0, 
b) �𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐, ?̅?𝑠�, where 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 = 𝑢𝑢� − 𝑟𝑟 (𝑑𝑑ζ?̅?𝑠)⁄ , is a boundary 
equilibrium at the partial saturation state with 𝑢𝑢�  > 
1
ζ
�
𝑟𝑟
𝑑𝑑?̅?𝑠
+ 𝑞𝑞?̅?𝑠
𝑟𝑟
�. 
 
Proof (Omitted; to be provided upon request) 
 
The analytical results about the steady state 
equilibriums in the platform ecosystem indicate that 
the heterogeneity of players has an effect on the 
structure of the equilibriums. For example, there is a 
possibility of the full saturation in the case of 
homogeneous users (Proposition 2 and a) in 
Proposition 3); whereas the full saturation state cannot 
be a boundary equilibrium with heterogeneous users 
due to the following interactions between users and 
suppliers (when other parameters remain the same). 
Once the behavior dynamics (Eq. (6) and (7)) leads the 
state to a point near to �𝑢𝑢� , ?̅?𝑠�, some users may find 
out that it is not beneficial to stay in the ecosystem and 
start to leave it. In the course of this adjustment, the 
dynamics cannot keep pushing the state toward the 
corner point �𝑢𝑢� , ?̅?𝑠�, and it settles down at �𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 , ?̅?𝑠� 
in the end (see b) in Proposition 4). This asymmetry 
seems to arise from the difference in the mechanism 
where the platform’s investment ζ affects the 
respective players’ payoffs. 
Facing the situations where at least one side is 
composed of heterogeneous participants, the platform’s 
leading role through investments seems more crucial to 
fostering the ecosystem than other initiatives directly 
aiming at the installed-bases. In other words, with 
heterogeneous participant configuration (e.g., highly 
differentiated), transaction efficiency is essential to 
triggering the ecosystem growth (TCV). Meanwhile, 
the role of active players as idiosyncratic resource 
(RBV) is relatively meager; once started, the dynamics 
draws participants until it reaches a partial saturation. 
The platform’s decision on the investment scale 
also plays an important role in determining boundary 
equilibriums in the contingencies above. For example, 
the full saturation as an equilibrium with homogeneous 
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users requires that the platform should maintain a large 
amount of investment (refer to the inequalities in 
Proposition 2 and those in a) of Proposition 3). The 
boundary equilibrium that occurs along the edge of 
𝑠𝑠 = ?̅?𝑠  (i.e., saturation of supplier side) with 
heterogeneous users (refer to b) in Proposition 4) also 
presumes a sufficient amount of investment from the 
platform. Also note that 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 → ?̅?𝑠 in Proposition 3 and 
𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 → 𝑢𝑢�  in Proposition 4 as ζ increases sufficiently. 
Therefore, we need to explicitly consider the 
platform’s investment decision (ζ), which will be dealt 
with in the next section in a more general framework 
(i.e., heterogeneities both in users and in suppliers).  
The analytical results in this section have been 
derived from a long-term perspective which presumes 
that the decision of the platform is stabilized. The 
actual dynamics, however, could alter the static 
equilibrium especially when the equilibrium causes a 
behavioral change of the platform and destroys the 
condition for the corresponding equilibrium. 
Unfortunately, one could not conduct a rigorous 
analysis for such possibilities without resorting to some 
numerical simulations. In the next section, we present a 
series of experiments and investigate some growth 
paths that representative scenarios could generate. 
 
4. Dynamics simulations and discussions 
 
In this section, the equilibriums in a platform 
ecosystem are analyzed by explicitly incorporating the 
platform’s dynamics and decisions. We first derive the 
optimal decision of the platform. Here, it is assumed 
that the platform’s moves are myopic (with its best 
guess about the change during the period), even though 
it can produce an optimal outcome in some periods. 
For the sake of explicit analysis, linear differentiation 
functions for 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) and 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) are assumed as before, 
that is, 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) = 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢� − 𝑢𝑢) and 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠, where both 
𝑑𝑑 and 𝑞𝑞 are positive constants (also see Propositions 
3 and 4). Thus, we now consider a more general 
situation in which both users and suppliers are 
heterogeneous. Then, on the basis of the decision rule 
below, we conduct a series of numerical simulations to 
examine the dynamic performance of the ecosystem. 
 
Proposition 5 (Optimal Decision of Platform) 
Given 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 , 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡  and 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  (all positive) at the 
beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 , let’s define three constants 
(over time period 𝑡𝑡 ) Φ𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝑏𝑏𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 , Θ𝑡𝑡 ≡
�𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 (𝑑𝑑Φ𝑡𝑡)⁄  (defined only for positive Φ𝑡𝑡 ) and 
Ψ𝑡𝑡 ≡ �𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 (𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)⁄ . Platform’s optimal decision in 
Eq. (3) on the amount of investment ζ𝑡𝑡
∗ at 𝑡𝑡 follows 
the rule below: 
CASE Ⅰ: 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 belong to (0, 𝑢𝑢�) and (0, ?̅?𝑠) resp. 
(1) if Φ𝑡𝑡 > 0 and Θ𝑡𝑡 < 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  then ζ𝑡𝑡
∗ = Θ𝑡𝑡 , 
(2) otherwise, ζ𝑡𝑡
∗ = 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 . 
CASE Ⅱ: Either 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 or 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (but not both) is out of its 
respective range, (0, 𝑢𝑢�) or (0, ?̅?𝑠). 
(3) with 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  < 0 (and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ∈ (0, ?̅?𝑠)), ζ𝑡𝑡
∗ = 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  if Φ𝑡𝑡  > 0 
and ζ𝑡𝑡
∗ = 0 otherwise. 
(4) with 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  ≥ ?̅?𝑠 (and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ∈ (0, 𝑢𝑢�)), ζ𝑡𝑡
∗ = Ψ𝑡𝑡  if Ψ𝑡𝑡  ≤ 
𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  and ζ𝑡𝑡
∗ = 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 otherwise. 
CASE Ⅲ: Neither 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 nor 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 belongs to its resp. set. 
(6) ζ𝑡𝑡
∗ = 0. 
 
Proof (Omitted; to be provided upon request) 
 
With the optimal responses of the platform 
summarized in Propositions 5 and the dynamics 
described by Eq. (4)-(7), a series of simulations are 
carried out. On the basis of these experiments, we 
ascertain whether the active players constitute effective 
resources for the platform (as RBV asserts) and 
whether the investment to improve the transaction 
efficiency effectively nurtures the ecosystem (as TCV 
asserts). We are also interested in some factors that are 
most influential in leading the ecosystem to a specific 
state (or scenario). In particular, we try to understand 
the relevant contingencies and the drivers in terms of 
either RBV or TCV or both. Along this line, we 
employ the following performance measures.  
 
 The sizes of active players in period 𝑡𝑡: 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡, 
 The platform’s profit and capital turnover (rate) at 𝑡𝑡: 
Π𝑡𝑡 and 𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡 ≡ Π𝑡𝑡 ζ𝑡𝑡−1⁄ , 
 The average payoffs of active players at 𝑡𝑡: ?̅?𝜇𝑡𝑡 ≡
1
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
∫ 𝜇𝜇(𝑢𝑢)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡0  and 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡 ≡ 1𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∫ 𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡0 . 
 
These measures are developed to answer our 
research questions raised in Introduction. For example, 
the scales of active players (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) are directly 
linked with our first question that whether the active 
players could reinforce the platform’s leadership in the 
ecosystem, thereby playing the role of an idiosyncratic 
asset, as suggested by RBV. Furthermore, the capital 
turnover (𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡) in the second performance measure is 
devised to determine the platform’s incentive to 
enhance its infrastructure for improving its transaction 
efficiency, primarily from the perspective of TCV. The 
last two measures ( ?̅?𝜇𝑡𝑡  and 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡 ) monitor the 
effectiveness of the platform’s activity (e.g., 
investment) in creating a virtuous cycle throughout an 
ecosystem, thereby sustaining and fostering the whole 
ecosystem. Evaluating the platform ecosystem from a 
wide range of angles will enhance our understanding of 
the platform’s role as a keystone player ([15] [18]). 
The following figures depict outcomes from an 
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example in which the parameters are fixed at certain 
values (for details, please refer to the description of the 
baseline experiments given below Fig. 2). We tried 
tuning the parameters throughout some pilot tests. For 
example, speed parameters such as 𝛼𝛼  and 𝛽𝛽  were 
tuned to be small; otherwise, the system adjusts itself 
too fast to properly reveal its dynamic behavior. 
Despite small 𝛼𝛼  and 𝛽𝛽 , the platform ecosystem 
stabilized in all the instances we tried. Thus, this 
manipulation for slow adaptation is maintained in the 
following simulation results. 
The simulation outcomes are categorized into some 
typical patterns, which could be justified by extensive 
trials rich enough to encompass a large number of 
instances. Fig. 2 demonstrates three most typical 
patterns of the system behavior. 
 
   
(a) Scenario A (b) Scenario B (c) Scenario C 
Figure 2. Changes in Users and Suppliers 
We set the parameters at the following numerical values: α = β = 
0.1, γ = 0.5, 𝛿𝛿𝑢𝑢 = 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 = 0.5 and 𝑢𝑢� = 𝑠𝑠̅ = 100. As the initial states, 
we set 𝑢𝑢0 = 𝑠𝑠0 = 50, 𝑟𝑟0 = 2, and 𝐵𝐵0 = 𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 . For the first two 
scenarios, we set d = 10 and q = 1 in order to make the comparisons 
as fair as possible. However, these settings cannot be maintained for 
generating the all-collapse case; we should, for example, set d = 1 
and q = 10 to craft Scenario C. Note that the platform’s cost is set to 
be one for all the three scenarios. We run the simulations over 100 
time periods (see the horizontal line). These parameters as well as 
the initial states remain same in the following figures. 
 
Each scenario corresponds to a specific steady-state 
equilibrium suggested in the previous section. For 
example, Scenarios B and C represent full saturation 
and complete collapse, respectively. Scenario A shows 
a partial saturation instance that resembles the 
equilibrium �𝑢𝑢� , 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐�  in Proposition 3, though the 
context assumed there (i.e., homogenous users) is 
different from that assumed in the simulation (i.e., 
heterogeneous players). Also note that the small 
difference between perfectly homogeneous users in 
Proposition 3 and a little heterogeneity of users in 
Scenario C produces opposite outcomes: the (possible) 
full saturation in the former vs. the complete collapse 
in the latter. In particular, Scenario C implies a specific 
contingency where neither active players nor 
platform’s investment works for prosperity of the 
ecosystem. Strong heterogeneities (particularly, across 
suppliers) seems like a source of this contingency.  
We focus on the first two scenarios: Scenarios A 
and B. Fig. 3 and 4 display and compare changes in the 
profits and capital turnover of the platform both in the 
early phase and steady state; Fig. 3 and 4 respectively 
depict the outcomes under Scenarios A and B. They 
show plots for the two performance measures of the 
platform against the market scale in the early phase as 
well as near the last phase. In many experiments, we 
observed that the overall qualitative aspects (e.g., 
pattern and graph shape) of the system behavior (in 
terms of the respective measure) remained unchanged. 
 
  
(a) Profit: early vs. steady (b) CT: early vs. steady 
Figure 3. Changes in Platform’s Profits and Capital 
Turnover (CT) in Scenario A 
 
  
(a) Profit: early vs. steady (b) CT: early vs. steady 
Figure 4. Changes in Platform’s Profits and Capital 
Turnover (CT) in Scenario B 
 
Both scenarios show that the platform’s profit 
increases as more players join the ecosystem (Fig. 3(a) 
and 4(a)). Thus, the outcomes seem to support the 
argument that users and suppliers play the role of 
idiosyncratic assets, as asserted by RBV ([25]). 
Considering the capital turnover as the measure of the 
platform’s performance (Fig. 3(b) and 4(b)), however, 
we see an opposite relation between the ecosystem 
scale and platform’s performance. Thus, we could not 
uniformly conclude that active users and suppliers 
constitute the ultimate source of profitability for the 
platform. We need to further investigate the role of 
investment at the level of the holistic ecosystem. 
The following figures display and compare changes 
in the average payoffs of active players against the 
amount of investment in the previous time period 
(since our event sequence assumes that the players’ 
adjustments are completed at the end of a period while 
the investment is in effect from the beginning of the 
period). Both Scenarios A and B result in similar 
outcomes. For example, the average payoff of active 
users consistently improves as the investment increases 
(Fig. 5(a) and 6(a)) thanks to the platform’s efforts to 
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enhance the service value through investments. On the 
other hand, the average payoff of active suppliers 
increases along the scale of investment in the early 
phase; however, near the steady state, they eventually 
settle down at a point, which is lower than the ones in 
the starting periods (Fig. 5(b) and 6(b)). This drop in 
efficiency gain is attributable to the congestion effect, 
which becomes stronger as the user side gets saturated 
(also note that the platform’s investment becomes fixed 
as the ecosystem approaches to a stead state). Thus, the 
average gain of active suppliers results in an inverted 
U-shape. This phenomenon seems to be independent of 
the size of active players since the numbers of active 
suppliers in the steady state differ between the two 
scenarios (𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 → 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐  in Scenario A and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 → ?̅?𝑠  (i.e., 
saturated) in Scenario B). The different behaviors 
between users and suppliers result from the different 
payoff structures (see Eq. (1) and (2)), particularly 
owing to the congestion factor (i.e., the negative 
network externality) in the suppliers’ payoff. 
 
  
(a) User AP: early vs. steady (b) Suppl. AP: early vs. steady 
Figure 5. Changes in Avg. Payoffs (AP) in Scenario A 
 
  
(a) User AP: early vs. steady (b) Suppl. AP: early vs. steady 
Figure 6. Changes in Avg. Payoffs (AP) in Scenario B 
 
However, this contrast between the users and 
suppliers should not lead to an underestimation of the 
role of investment in creating value and nurturing the 
ecosystem. Particularly, the active playersboth users 
and suppliersin the early phase enjoy positive payoff 
streams thanks to the platform investment, since it 
reduces the costs for transactions between two groups, 
as asserted by TCV. Players’ gain or loss may result 
from sacrifice by or exploitation of the platform in the 
course of its value creation and propagation. 
To examine more closely these profitability links, 
we demonstrate the platform’s payoffs together with 
those of participants in Fig. 7. Here, we observe co-
prosperity in both scenarios at least in the early phase, 
which implies a positive feedback loop of payoff 
streams for all the participants in an ecosystem. This 
co-prosperity, however, ends when one side (here, the 
user side) reaches the saturation state. Thereafter, the 
platform starts to rein back the investment (not 
displayed in the figures), and some suppliers suffer 
from increased transaction costs despite having 
enjoyed the saturated user side. Furthermore, 
diminishing average payoff on the supplier side could 
be aggravated owing to the congestion effect. 
 
  
(a) Scenario A (b) Scenario B 
Figure 7. Profitability Links in Platform Ecosystem 
 
Thus far, our experiments show that a platform 
ecosystem is able to sustainably leverage idiosyncratic 
assets as well as transaction efficiency, the two key 
notions that constitute the modern firm theory.  
However, users and suppliers not only serve as 
assets but also consume other platform resources. 
Accordingly, they cannot be as perfectly idiosyncratic 
as a proprietary asset that is not available to the 
participants. Furthermore, the congestion effect on one 
side (here, the supplier side) is likely to undermine the 
potential of active participants. This presents a 
challenge to discover another core asset for a platform 
ecosystem, which better complies with RBV. 
On the other hand, the function of investment for 
improving the transaction efficiency between the 
participants seems more critical to ecosystem 
management. The platform’s efforts to reduce 
transaction costs foster the entire ecosystem and 
coincide with participants’ proliferation (at least in the 
early phase of its growth in Fig. 7). Further, some 
contingencies such as heterogeneity in participants 
dwarf the potential of active players as idiosyncratic 
assets for the platform. Subsequently, the following 
hypothesis could be proposed; “with heterogeneous 
participants, the fundamental rationale of existence of 
the platform stems from its initiatives more compatible 
with TCV than RBV.” Going one step further, our 
findings also confirm a general observation on the 
typical life-cycle behavior of the platform ecosystem 
and explain this behavioral pattern. That is, a platform 
starts to create a marketplace and promote its 
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ecosystem, and after building up a certain scale of 
installed-base, it maneuvers the ecosystem toward a 
hierarchy. And platform’s investments work as a main 
driver that leads and moderates this movement along 
the spectrum of market vs. hierarchy.  
This point provides insight into the platform’s role 
in its ecosystem. For example, the platform needs to 
conduct a maneuver for the congestion side and 
suppress surging participants, if necessary, for 
sustainable growth of its ecosystem. (This point also 
explains another reason for the scale of the participants 
not being a perfect asset for the platform.) This kind of 
admission control is what Apple is pursuing as a part of 
its Appstore policy. Selective permission for being a 
supplier to the platform (Appstore) alleviates the 
congestion effect and maintains a certain level of 
quality, which is essential for a healthy ecosystem.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study presents a stylized model for dynamic 
nonlinear value creation across multiple players in a 
platform ecosystem. The proposed model incorporates 
two perspectives of firm theories to help understand 
the roles of a platform and the fundamental organizing 
principle of its ecosystem. RBV considers the 
participants—users and suppliers—as not only clients 
but also assets of the platform; meanwhile, TCV 
provides the reason for the existence of the platform: to 
reduce the transaction costs across the participants. Our 
models together with analyses and experiments suggest 
that the fundamental role of a platform lies in 
controlling the transactions across its participants, 
moving along the spectrum of market vs. hierarchy. 
Leveraging both market and organization, as platforms 
do, may provide a hint for a prototype of IT-intensive 
service operations encompassing newly emerging O2O 
(online-to-offline) services. 
Since our results are based on the stylized, 
conceptual model, they have some limits when 
applying to real cases. First, some simplifying 
assumptions in the model (e.g., Eq. (3)) may restrict 
platform’s behavior and lead the entire ecosystem 
toward some specific directions. The context of this 
study is limited, too. For example, the current approach 
considers neither vertical differentiation strategy of the 
platform nor collaborations among the suppliers. 
Lastly, the current framework needs to be extended to 
incorporate competing platforms, which probably 
affects the entire dynamics. 
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